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When Artemisia Gentileschi was eighteen years old, Agostino Tassi, a colleague of 
her father’s, entered her house, found her painting, threw her down, and raped her. 
Today Artemisia2 is recognized as one of the greatest artistic talents of the 
sixteenth century. Her first signed painting, Susanna and the Elders at 
Pommersfelden, was completed in the year before her rape, and depicts the biblical 
character Susanna, who was not raped, but was threatened with death to submit to 
the amorous desires of two community elders (Daniel 13). Although Jean-Luc 
Nancy does not directly speak about Artemisia’s physical or artistic encounters 
with rape, the interplay of three of his ideas holds significance for the way in 
which Artemisia’s two encounters with sexual violence interact with each other. 
By examining Nancy’s theories of sense, violence, and image in relation to one 
another, this paper will address the possibility that images of violence structurally 
resist the force of physical occurrences of violence. 
 
Sense and Violence 
 
For Nancy, sense refers to a system of knowledge in which knowing subjects come 
to understand, or make sense of, the environment around them, and thereby create 
a sensible world. In Nancy’s thought, this system of sense is necessarily dependent 
on a division within sense itself. In his paper “A Finite Thinking,” Nancy (2003a) 
writes, “Sense depends on relating to itself as to another or to some other” (6). The 
act of sense, or the act of understanding, requires two participants: there is a 
subject who knows, and an object that is known—an object of understanding. 
                                                
1 A version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Phenomenology 
and Existential Philosophy in October 2010. I am grateful for the feedback of those who were 
present. I would also like to thank Nancy Margolis for generously reading and commenting on an 
earlier draft of this paper. 
2 I refer to Artemisia by her first name in order to distinguish her from her father, Orazio 
Gentileschi, who was also a painter of note during the Baroque period. 
 Since the process of understanding moves from a lack of knowledge about the 
object of understanding to positive knowledge of the object of understanding, the 
object of understanding must be something that is initially foreign to, or removed 
from, the subject who understands. If there is to be understanding, there must be a 
space between the knowing subject and the object it knows, so that the subject can 
come to know the object through the process of understanding. In terms of sense, 
or the structure of understanding in general, this means that there must be a 
division within sense between that which understands and that which is 
understood, a division that makes sense itself possible (Nancy 2003a, 5-6). 
Stated in another way, “what produces sense” is the act of sense “being 
grasped” or “grasping itself as sense” (Nancy 2003a, 5). If sense is indeed to be 
produced in this very movement of grasping itself, then sense is necessarily 
dependent on the otherness of itself. If sense did not relate to itself as to another 
(Nancy 2003a, 6), then it would be impossible to speak of sense grasping itself. 
The motion of grasping requires an element of otherness. That which grasps can 
only grasp what is other to it; even when one grasps oneself, say, when one grasps 
one’s own arm, the arm that is grasped is other than the hand that grasps it. If sense 
were entirely unitary, it would be unable to maintain the element of otherness that 
is required for sense to be possible in the first place, and sense itself would 
disappear (Nancy 2003a, 6). 
For Nancy (2003a), then, sense “is the openness of a relation to itself” (6). 
The difference between sense and itself, the difference between the sense that 
grasps sense and the sense that is grasped by sense, generates the possibility of 
there being sense at all. Because there is this difference in the relationship of sense 
to itself, sense itself can exist. The difference gives sense something to grasp, 
thereby enabling sense to be sense, and thereby requiring that sense always 
maintain this difference. 
Violence, on the other hand, is interested in destroying the influence of 
anything that differs from itself. In describing the destructive character of violence, 
Nancy makes three important points. First, destruction is built into the very 
definition of violence. In his paper “Image and Violence”, Nancy (2005b) defines 
violence as “the application of a force that remains foreign to the dynamic or 
energetic system into which it intervenes” (16). Violence is that which imposes 
itself onto a system foreign to itself without becoming a part of that system or 
respecting the logic of that system. Instead, violence “denatures, wrecks, and 
massacres that which it assaults” (Nancy 2005b, 16). This is the second point. In its 
lack of concern with, and attention to, the system it imposes itself on, and in its 
interest in nothing more than this pure imposition, violence does damage to the 
system. Third, violence seeks to make what is not itself, what it assaults, into 
nothing but an image of itself (Nancy 2005b, 16). Through the act of violence, 
 violence denies that its victims have any identity apart from the violent act itself. 
Violence identifies its victims as nothing more than victims, nothing more than 
those who have been assaulted, and in doing so it asserts that its victims have 
identity only through their relationship to their violators (Nancy 2005b, 16). 
Victims become nothing more than the imprint of violence upon them (Nancy 
2005b, 16). 
The movement of violence is entirely contrary to the movement of sense. 
Instead of opening a space between itself and others, violence seeks to appropriate 
everything that is not itself into itself, so that there is no opening between things, 
but simply the mark of violence everywhere (Nancy 2005b, 16). Violence refuses 
to enter into a relationship that would generate sense, opting instead for 
relationships that are destructive to the very idea of sense. In Nancy’s (2005b) 
language, this makes violence “profoundly stupid” (16); the ontological structure 
of violence, the way in which violence exists, shuts down the space that is 
necessary for the generation of sense. 
 
Rape as an Act of Violence 
 
Rape is one of the many forms violence can take. In “In Praise of the Melee”, 
Nancy (2003b) writes that rape is “A null act, a negation of sex itself, a negation of 
relation, a negation of the child, of the woman; an act of pure affirmation on the 
part of the rapist, in whom a ‘pure identity’ is unable to offer anything better than a 
vile imitation of what it negates: relationship and being-together” (286). Sex, in its 
non-violent form, is an intimate act that marks two people converging on one 
another, or coming together. It is entirely, inherently, completely, relational. When 
a person is raped, she is forced into a sexual relationship in such a way that the 
relational aspect of sex is destroyed. That she is being forced, that her will and her 
voice are being ignored, is a denial of her significance as an individual. She does 
not matter; what matters is the will of her rapist. By raping her, her rapist is 
asserting that she is insignificant to him, meaningless to him, that she has no 
influence over him. His existence, his identity, is not impacted by her in the least. 
Nancy (2003b) speaks of rape in a paper written for Sarajevo, in which he 
asserts that his project is 
 
To do justice to identities—without giving in to their delusion, to the 
presumption that they are, substantially, identities: this is the job at hand. 
It’s both immense and very simple: to remake culture, no less, to remake 
thought so that it is not crude, rubbish, like any thinking of purity; to remix 
lineages, paths, and skins, but also to describe their heterogeneous 
trajectories, their networks, which are at once crossed and distinct. (279) 
  
Nancy wants to retain the distinction of identities, or the singularity of identities, 
without falling into the myth that identities are what they are completely 
independently of any relationship to anything else, of any mixture with anything 
else. “By definition, identity is not an absolute distinction, cut off from everything 
and therefore distinct from nothing: it is always the other of an other identity” 
(Nancy 2003b, 280). For Nancy, identity is what it is precisely by not being 
something else. We are what we are because we are able to distinguish ourselves 
from what we are not. This means, in turn, that what we are not is an essential part 
of what we are; if we were unable to differentiate ourselves from what we are not, 
if there was no “what we are not”, we would have no identity. “What we are not” 
enables us to be what we are. And so just as sense needs to be an other to itself in 
order to exist, identity exists through the other that is equally itself. 
Nancy is writing, literally, in praise of the melee. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines “melee” as “A confusion, jumble; a medley, a mixture.” The 
“melee” indicates that identity is not pure, that identity comes closer to being a 
confused blend. On Nancy’s interpretation of Sarajevo, the rape camps served the 
purpose of negating the melee of identity:  
 
[T]he systemic rape of Bosnian women unfurled in exemplary fashion all 
the figures of the delusional affirmation of a community “one” with itself: 
rape in order to engender “bastards,” deemed unacceptable, excluded a 
priori from the presupposed unity; rape in order to force the abortion of 
these bastards; rape, then, in order to kill and destroy the very possibility 
of the bastard; rape so that this repeated act will draw its victims into the 
fantastic unity of their “community”; rape in order to make manifest in 
every possible way that there should be no relations between 
communities. (Nancy 2003b, 285) 
 
The rape camps created children, a mixture of mother and father, who were then 
aborted (Nancy 2003b, 285).3 In so doing, the rapists were negating the melee, the 
mixture of mother and father, the linking of communities. The rapists were 
asserting their independence from the melee, establishing the identity of their 
community independently of the influence of any other community. And as much 
                                                
3 There are feminist scholars who would disagree with Nancy’s argument that the Sarajevo rape 
camps were primarily interested in aborting “bastards.” Catharine MacKinnon, in particular, 
notes that Bosnian rape camps often held pregnant women until it was unsafe for them to get an 
abortion, indicating that one of the purposes of the camps was, in fact, to generate children (see 
Mackinnon 2006). 
 as these other communities constitute an essential part of their identity, the rapists 
were denying the self that was other to them. 
 
Artemisia’s Two Encounters with Sexual Violence: the Physical and the 
Artistic 
 
Artemisia Gentileschi was not a part of Sarajevo; nor was she the survivor of a 
rape camp. But Artemisia Gentileschi was—allegedly—raped. Artemisia was born 
in Rome on 8 July 1593 to Orazio Gentileshi and Prudentia Montone. As a youth 
she was schooled in art by her father, who was himself an accomplished artist. 
Artemisia made her first original, and remarkable, contribution to the artistic 
community at the age of seventeen. Two years later, in March of 1612 Orazio 
publicly accused Agostino Tassi, an artistic colleague, of raping and “deflowering” 
Artemisia. This accusation led to a seven month trial in which Artemisia was 
subjected to public physical examinations by two obstetricians, and was tortured 
with the sibille—a device that tightens metal rings around the fingers of its 
victim—in order to ascertain the truth of her testimony. Despite Tassi’s previous 
sexual offenses, and the numerous flaws in his testimony and in the testimonies of 
the witnesses who spoke on his behalf, the charges against Tassi were dismissed, 
and he was released after serving only eight months in prison. On 29 November 
1612, Artemisia married Florentine artist Pietro Antonio di Vincenzo Stattesi, and 
left Rome for Florence. Artemisia subsequently became a respected artist, and she 
is currently recognized as one of the greatest talents of her time (see Garrard 1999). 
In 1610, the year before her rape, Artemisia 
completed her first signed painting, Susanna and 
the Elders at Pommersfelden. The story of Susanna 
is found in the Apocryphal thirteenth chapter of the 
Book of Daniel, which describes Susanna as a 
beautiful and God-fearing woman, the wife of a 
pillar of the Jewish community. According to the 
text, two judges fell in love with Susanna, and 
happening upon her alone in her garden one day, 
they demanded that she submit to their desires, 
threatening that if she did not they would accuse her 
of adultery, a crime that was punishable by death. 
Susanna refused the judges. She was subsequently 
charged with adultery, and sentenced to death by 
stoning. Before she was executed, the young Daniel 
Artemisia Gentileschi. Susanna and 
the Elders. 1610. Oil on Canvas. 66.9 
in. x 46.9 in. Pommersfelden, Schloss 
Weissenstein. 
 
 publicly denounced the judges and proved that they had been lying, saving 
Susanna and condemning her accusers to execution in her place.  
Unlike Artemisia, Susanna was not raped, and in this her experience differs 
from Artemisia’s. But Susanna was threatened with rape, she was threatened with 
death, and she was subjected to the brutality of slander, all of which display a 
violence that is fundamentally similar to that of rape. When Artemisia was raped, 
the significance of her existence as an individual was denied, affirmed as nothing 
more than the object of her assaulter’s violence. Susanna’s assaulters did much the 
same thing, denying that her existence had import apart from her submission to 
their will, and even asserting that her existence would cease if she resisted their 
will. Despite the differences in their situations, the assaulters of both Artemisia and 
of her artistic subject used sexual violence as a way of stamping out the women’s 
individual existences.  
 
Art and Violence 
 
Four centuries after Artemisia was raped, Nancy crafted a theory of art that casts a 
unique light on the relationship between Artemisia’s rape and her painting of 
Susanna’s assault. The core of Nancy’s theory of art revolves, once again, around 
difference and identity. In “Image and Violence” Nancy (2005b) intimately links 
the identity of the image of a thing to the subject it represents, speaking of the 
image as showing its audience the “unity and force” of that which it represents 
(22). The image, for Nancy, does not show us only the features of the represented 
subject, as if it were merely giving us an inventory of parts. Rather, in showing us 
the features of the represented subject, the image shows us something deeper; it 
shows us the force that holds the features together, the force that makes the 
features something more than a disjunctive series of components, the force that 
makes the represented subject an entity, a thing (Nancy 2005b, 22). The image 
displays the identity of what it represents, making the image an expression of the 
represented subject, and essentially connecting the very being of the image to the 
represented subject. The identity of the represented subject is displayed by the 
image, making the image the canvas of the subject’s identity. The image becomes, 
in a way, what it represents: the very core of the subject. 
However, Nancy notes that in its representation of the subject, the image 
also acts as the represented subject’s rival, competing with the represented subject 
for existence itself. In his own words, the image of the represented subject “rivals 
the thing, and this rivalry implies not so much reproduction as competition, and, in 
relation to what concerns us here, competition for presence” (Nancy 2005b, 21). 
The term “presence” denotes the fact of existing, or of being present (Oxford 
English Dictionary). In rivaling the presence of its represented subject, the image 
 of the subject competes with the subject it represents for existence. Competition, 
by definition, involves competing parties attempting to win something by beating 
or by bettering their competitors. That the image competes with its represented 
subject means that the image does not simply assert itself; it attempts to assert its 
own existence over and above the subject it represents. 
Taken together, these two elements of Nancy’s artistic theory imply that the 
image is both a representation of the subject it images—a representation that is 
intimate enough to display the unifying force of the subject—and an entity distinct 
enough from the imaged subject that it can wrestle with the imaged subject for 
existence. Through this dual-natured relationship, the image presents the 
represented subject to itself. Nancy (2005b) writes, “The image is what takes the 
thing out of its simple presence and brings it […] to being-out-in-front-of-itself” 
(21). To move from “simple presence” to “being-out-in-front-of-itself” is to move 
from the state of simply being, to the state of examining oneself. That the image is 
distinct from the subject it represents means that the image can be, and is, out in 
front of the imaged subject, such that the imaged subject can gaze upon it. And that 
image is reflective of the subject it represents means that what is out in front of the 
represented subject is the represented subject itself, requiring that the represented 
subject face itself, confront itself. The image creates a space between the 
represented subject and itself such that the represented subject becomes an issue to 
itself. 
What is significant for this project is that the structure of Nancy’s theory of 
art mirrors the structure of his theory of sense. The image, like sense, is dependent 
on an act of the self becoming other to itself, while at the same time keeping 
something of the status of the self. This is what image is, the representation of the 
imaged subject that is at one and the same time identical to the imaged subject and 
distinct from the imaged subject. To image violence, then, would be to make a 
representation of violence that is at the same time distinct from violence. It would 
be to bring violence to “being-out-in-front-of-itself,” which reverses the movement 
of violence. Instead of closing down the space between individuals by denying the 
significance of diverse individuals, violence would be put into a form where it 
would necessarily be faced with a self that is other than it, thereby opening the 
space between individuals that violence shuts down. And insofar as this reverse 
movement of violence—the movement of violence confronting itself that is 
brought about through image—is also the movement of sense, the imaging of 
violence could hold the potential to bring violence back into the realm of sense. 
 
Artemisia’s Revenge 
 
 Nancy’s thought indicates that the imaging of violence, or artistic depictions of 
violence, could have two remedial functions. First, the imaging of violence could 
be interpreted as restoring a certain moral equilibrium to situations of violence. By 
creating a multiplicity of identity in a system that seeks to deny any multiplicity, 
and thus denies the significance of individuals other than itself, art could open up 
the possibility for survivors of violence to reassert their individuality. Violence 
denies the significance, and the very being, of its victims. Art affirms both the 
presence and the value of diverse individuals. It gives individuals who have 
previously been oppressed or abused the chance to reestablish their worth, their 
importance, and their existence.  
Secondly, art could help generate conversations about violence. 
Conversations always happen within the context of sense, or acts of understanding: 
in order to communicate with one another, we must be able to understand what the 
other person is saying. Violence disrupts understanding by destroying the diversity 
that is at the heart of understanding. Art maintains understanding by creating 
diversity. Artistic depictions of violence bring violence back into the realm of 
understanding, which means they also bring violence back into a setting in which 
meaningful communication is possible. If violence is in the realm of 
understanding, then we can begin to speak about it, and its survivors are given a 
context in which their experiences, and their voices, can be heard. 
When Artemisia imaged the violence done to Susanna, then, she did two 
things. Artemisia remade Susanna’s violence into a form that, on a structural level, 
mended the damage Susanna’s assaulters had done to her individuality. Artemisia 
also placed Susanna’s violence into a context where Susanna’s voice could be 
heard; she helped her audience hear Susanna. And while Artemisia never painted 
her own rape, by painting the general subject of rape she made a stand against the 
identity-crushing force of rape in general, and she contributed to a discourse about 
rape. Both of these things could have established an environment conducive to her 
recovery from her own encounter with rape. Through her depiction of Susanna, 
Artemisia fought back against the violence done to Susanna, and the violence she 
would undergo herself a year later. 
It is important to note here, with Nancy (2005b), that “Art is not a 
simulacrum or apotropaic form that would protect us from unjustifiable violence” 
(26). Whatever remedial functions art might have, it still cannot end or undo actual 
acts of violence. That Artemisia painted the violence of the Susanna story does not 
mean that the violence of the story has somehow been undone, or that the wrongs 
Susanna suffered have been righted. Susanna’s story is still violent, and the wrongs 
she suffered are still wrongs. Art cannot change that. Nor can art prevent future 
violent acts from happening. When Agostino Tassi raped Artemisia, he was not 
stopped by her Susanna. He did not look at the violence in the image, see the 
 agony on Susanna’s face, and halt his own assault. Imaging Susanna’s violence did 
not prevent Artemisia from experiencing violence of her own.  
But Artemisia’s painting did do something else, something important. In 
imaging violence, and in bringing violence back into the realm of understanding, 
Artemisia created the possibility of meaningful interaction with violence. She 
created the possibility for her audience to think about violence, to speak about 
violence, and to come to know the survivors of violence. Artemisia opened up a 
space in which the voices of survivors could be heard. And while this did not undo 
the violence that was already done, perhaps it did offer a small amount of revenge; 
perhaps this is Artemisia’s revenge. 
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